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The clause in the Constitution of the United States under
which the power of suspending the privilege of the Writ of
H abeas Corpus is to be exercised, is as follows : " The privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless,
when in ca<ies of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
r equire it." This clause implies that the privilege, under the
circumstances mentioned, may be suspended- the only question being as to the department of the Government on which
the Convention, which framed the Constitution, intenil.ecl to
confer this important power . The clause itself is silent on this
point, leaving its determination to arguments to be drawn from
the implied intention of the Convention.
The question, though not entirely new, was first argued at
length by Chief Justice Taney, in the case of ex parte John
Merryman. The principal reasons are there given, in a clear
and a.ble manner, in favor of Congress, and against the Executive. The chief positions a.re the weakness of the ExecutiYC
power, the position of the clause among restrictions on the
Legislature, analogy to the English Constitution, and the author ity of our greatest jurists.
As this was a decision by a single Judge, and not by the
whole Court, Mr. Binney, considering the question unsettled,
haio presented an entirely different view of it, claiming for the
Executive the power of suspension. 'ro an examination of the
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correctness of this view the following remarks will be directed.
If it be proYed false, the original argument will stand.
The meaning of several words and phrases will first cla.im
attention.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a common law writ, whose
name and object are both familiar. It was derived from E ngland to the colonies, au<l was in force in all of them, at the time
of the formation of the Constitution. Now, with regard to the
construction of laws Blackstone uses the following language :
"Wor<ls are generally to be understood in their usual and most.
known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of
g1·ammar, as their general ancl popular use." "Again," he
s:iys, "terms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, an<l
science. So in the act of settlement, when the crown of England is limited 'to the Prince8s Sophia, and the heirs of her
body, being Protestants,' it becomes necessary to call in the
assistance of lawyers, to ascertain the precise idea of the words
'heirs of her body,' which, in a legal sense, comprise only certain of her lineal descendants." 'l'he italics are our own. According to this rule of construction, the Writ of Habeas Corpus
must be understood as it was by the lawyers of 1787, ,rhen, as
now, it had a technical signification, and was tlie Writ which
an imprisoned person might apply for, in order to inquire into
the c:iuse of his commitment, and, according to the result of the
inquiry, to be bailed, discharged, or remanded. So the pl'ivilege of the Writ of Ilabeas Corpus does not mean the privilege
of being bailed, discharged, or remanded, generally, and by any
manner of z)roceed-ing; but the privilege of being bailed, discharged, or remanded, by proceeding on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, and no other; nor would Congress, invested as it is
merely with delegated powers, have the right to introduce into
the judicial system of the United States, any other means of
being bailed, discharged, or r emanded, but is bound to follow
that prescribed by the Constitution, the assertions of l\fr. Bin~
ney to the contrary notwithstanding. The word priv£lege
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means that which a person, community, or nation has OYer
and aborn another person, community, or nation. It here
mca.ns more than right. It implies further, that there are
other persons, communities, or nations who do not enjoy that
. right. It was applied in this sense to English subjects, and is
now applied in the same sense to American citizens. Privilege
is pe1·sonal, though, as appears from the definition given, need
not be confined to a single person. It is not of itself reme<ly,
but strictly that which entitles to remedy. Thus, in the clause
under discussion, the words are : "The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not" be suspended, &c." Here privilege is
that which entitles to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, which latter
is one of the remedies for false imprisonment. The word right
has substantially the same meaning as privilege in this clause,
the reference to our superiority in the latter being little more
than a rhetorical flourish. If the privilege is taken away or
• suspended, the Writ will be virtually ta.ken awa.y or suspended,
and vice versa. So that they seem each to be an essential ingredient of remedy.
The meaning of the word suspend, is primarily to hang upan idea which the Romans expressed by the words hang imder.
Its secondary meaning, which is a popular one, and that in
which it is here used, is to hang up, or cause to cease, for a time.
The word itself, however, conveys the meaning better than any
combination of words can, and the necessity of entering into a
philological examination of the meaning of a word of that
description, is only evidence of the wea.kness of the side which
etymology is employed to support.
With these explanations, I come to Mr. Binney's first point,
,vhich is, that "suspending a privilege" is an executive act, and
must therefore be left to the President. The gist of his :.wgurncut is, that the act of suspension bears directly on the perJiOnal privilege of each individual, and of one individual at a
~ime, and must therefore be an executive act.
If Mr. Binney's view of the nn.turc of the act, signified by
Fhe words "suspending the privilege," be correct, there is
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scarce a restriction on the Legislature, in tho Constitution of
the United States, the language of which may not be so modified, without substantially affecting the sense, as according to
his method of reasoning, to change the restriction on the Legislature, into one on the Executive. Thus, there is this clause in
the Constitution-" No tax shall be laid on Articles exported,"
which is a plain restriction on the Legislature. Now if this
were cha,nged so as to read thus, "'.l'he privilege of being
exempt from any tax on Articles exported, shall not be taken
away." Although every one would agree that this change of
language makes no substantial difference in the meaning, and
only points to the exemption from a tax on Articles exported,
as a privilege-an idea not conveyed in the former clause, but
of no essential importance; yet Mr. Binney, if he were consistent, would argue that, taking away the privilege in this
case, was an executive act (for taking away is an act of the
same natlll'e as suspending, as to suspend is only to take away
for a time.) But, as he well knows that taxes can be laid by
Congress alone, he would be forced to the conclusion that
an executive act could be performed by the Legislaturean absurdity which proves the falsity of the premises. Suspending a privilege is not, then, necessarily an executive act.
It may be either an executive or a legislative act. The words
themselves determine nothing, one way or the other, on this
point . Recourse must be had to other sources for an answer.
Laying aside English analogy for the present, the history of
the clause in the Constitution furnishes not only an answer to
the question whether "suspending a privilege" is an act which
may be done by the Legislature, but also a strong argument
that in this particular instance, it was intended that the act of
suspending the privilege should be a legislative act. The latter
point, however, belongs to another part of the discussion.
The history is given by Mr. Binney. The Convention first
met on the 14th May, 1787. On the 20th i)fay, Mr. Charles
Pinckney, of South Carolina, exh_ibited a "Plan of a Federal
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Constitution," the 6th Article of which, concerning the Legis•
lature, contained the following language:
"All laws regulating commerce shall require the assent of
two-thirds of the members present in each house. The United
States shall not grant any title of nobility. The Legislature
of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of
religion, nor touching or abridging the liberty of the press ;
no1· shall tlie privilege of tlie Writ of Habeas Uorpits ever be
su,spended, except iu case of rebellion or invasion."
On the 20th August, 1787, Mr. Pinckney again brought for•
ward a Habeas Corpus proposition in the following form :
"The privileges and benefits of the Writ of Ilabeas Corpus
shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and
ample manner; and shall not be suspended by tlie L egislature,
except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a,
limited time, not exceeding
months." On the 28th August,
the proposition which now forms part of the Constitution, was,
on motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris, adopted after some
debate. From this, it appears that Mr. Pinckney, of South
Carolina, is the author of the expression "The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended ;" and although
the word Legislature was not used in his "Plan" to denote the
suspending power, Mr. Binney admits that it was the intention
of Mr. Pinckney, that the Legislature should have the po"·e1-.
Without saying more on this point, I will content myself
with the evident conclusion that the phrase "suspending a
privilege" may be very properly applied to the Legislature.
Now if we can prove that English analogy has not been affected
by the argument of Mr. Binney, or if it can be shown, independently of any analogy, that the Convention intended to
confer this power on Congress, and that the exception does not
interfere with the argument, the power is with Congress.
Before entering upon this part of the discussion, however, I
wish to answer some objections to the words "privilege of the
Writ."
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We a,re continually confrontecl with the distinction between
the Writ or Act, and the privile9e of the Writ.
Now the word Act could not have been properly inserted,
because it was uncertain whether or not there would be any occasion for an Act, and up to the beginning of the present rebellion,
the pure and upright character of our judges, and the strict
regard for the Constitution evinced by our executive department,
ha\'C dispensed with the necessity of placing any restraints
whatc\'er, upon their conduct in this particular. Further, as
the object of a Habeas Corpus ·Act is only to secure the full
and untrammeled enjoyment of the Writ, it is confidently submitted that the language of the Constitution is broad enough to
con:ir the whole ground, Act or no Act, while a suspension of
the Act, if one were passed, would leave the privilege ·open in
all cases not covered by the Act. This also explains why Parliament does not suspend the Act. It would be an incomplete
mode of obtaining the object sought. Why the word 1Vl'it
was not used instead of the privilege of the Writ, (though it is
11ot a matt er of much importance, as the Writ a.n d the privilege
of the Writ have in effect, the same meaning) admits of an easy
expbnation. For, it must not be overlooked, that the Constit ut ion is a good specimen of clear composition, as well as a
great Charter of Rights. Now as we cannot form an idea of t he
:,uspeosion of the W?·it of Habeas Corpus (unless probably the
suspension of the piece of paper which contains the words of
the Writ), but the mind must at the same t ime take in the suspension of the operation, benefit, or privilege of the Writ, Mr.
Pinckney was merely supplying a natural inference of the mind,
by the language of his "Plan of a Federal Constitution," wit hout in any manner, intending to afford an opportunity for such
an argument as that of Mr. Binney. Mr. Gouverneur Morris,
juasmuch as he adopted Mr. Pinckney's language without comment, either by himself or any member of the Convention, we
are bound to believe, adopted it with exactly the same meaning,
unless his qualification of the except ion was intended to modify
it ; and that it was not, I will attempt to show hereafter.
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With regard to the position that the suspension of the privilege
cannot apply to the iiniversal privilege, a few remarks will
show that there is no absurdity whatever, connected with it.
The privilege, universal as it is, while a person enjoys l1is
freedom, amounts to nothing. I t is a right in esse, to be
enjoyed in a contingency in futiwo. It is completely barren,
and whether it is in force or is suspended, is a matter of no
significance whatever. But when a person is deprived of his
liberty by irnprisonment, the privilege bears fruit by entitling
its possessor to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case also,
the suspension of the privilege is effectual in depriving the
possessor of the means of regaining his liberty. And surely
no one will claim for those, who suspend the privilege, a greater
exemption than the people in general. A little reflection will
prove that the only difference between this method of carrying
out the provisions of the Constitution and that of Mr. Binney,
is that in the former case, Congress using its judgment in times
of rebellion or invasion, suspends the privilege, limiting the
suspension at discretion, either as to offences, persons, or place,
to which act of suspension it requires an arrest and imprisonment by the Executive, to give effect; while in the latter case,
the warrant of arrest, if there be a formal warrant, is or ought
to be, accompanied with an order, suspending the privilege of
the person imprisoned- the only substantial difference being
the discretionary power of Congress in times of rebellion or
inrnsion. In order further to repel the charge of absurdity,
we must remember that the object of the clause in the Constit ution is to put it in the power of one of the departments of
the government to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, as to those, who, in times of rebellion or invasion, contribute to the success of the rebels or invaders, by acts prejudicial
to the government, and that the legitimate province of Congress,
the department intended to have the power, is within the circle of
political offenders. If a greater power than this be attributed
to Congress, a point which it is uot necessary to dispute, the
evident reply is, that according to Mr. Binney's construction,
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the same power may be exercised by the President; for his
power would extend none the less to the universal privilege,
because it was to be exercised by a number of individual acts.
Which, then, is the greater absurdity ; for a body of men, immedately representing the people, and in whose hands liberty, in
a people capable of self-government, has never been looked
upon as being in danger ; or for a single man, influenced as he
may be, by feelings of partiality, malice, or ambition, to possess
the power? No one who understands the working of a representative government, would place the absurdity on the side of
Congress. These remarks, in connection with those immediately
preceding, and with the fact that the Writ of Habeas Corpus
is the great Writ of freedom, and that all interferences must
be regarded with a view to their influence upon liberty, shift
the absurdity to the side of the Executive.
.
llaving thus shown that the peculiar language of the clause
in the Constitution has no force on either side, that the words
"suspending the privilege" are as applicable to the Legislatu,re
as to the Executive, and that there is no absurdity in extendjng
the power of the Legislature to the universal privilege, we must
have recourse to other sources for light on this subject.
The fact that our government has been modeled after that of
England, so far as a Republic can be modeled after a limited
Monarchy, naturally leads us, in examining doubtful powers of
our Constitution, to refer to the analogy of England. In the
present case is afforded an opportunity for such reference ; but
we are met at the outset with the assertion that there are three
principal points of difference between the English and American
systems of government, which exclude the application of this
analogy. Let us inquire whether there are such differences,
and if so, whether they are of such a character as to destroy, or
affect the analogy.
This portion of Mr. Binney's argument, it will be observed,
proceeds on the principle that this power may be exercised by
Congress. He therefore cannot regard his reasoning as to the
meaning of the words "suspending the privilege," as conclu-
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sive; for if they can describe only an executive act, there can
be no weight in the argument that this power is exercisable by
the Legislature, and of course no place for English analogy.
He evidently, then, assumes at least, that "suspending the
privilege" is an act within legislative jurisdiction, but contends
that the nature of the English Constitution affords no analogy
for determining the depository of the present power.
The object of this part of Mr. Binney's argument is to overthrow the position of those who contend that the power is to
be exercised by Congress. It is, therefore, of no advantage to
his own position, further than as it is a successful attack on
that of the advocates in favor of Congress. But as this analogy
forms a strong link in the chain of argument on the side uf
Congress, the force of the attack must be met and measured.
This brings me to the first point of difference, suggested by
Mr. Binney. And here, there are two circumstances which
must not be overlooked. The first is, that the English Constitution is unwritten, while that of the United States is w1·itten ;
and the second is, the great power of Parliament.
In order to compare the two Constitutions, it is necessary to
consider that of England wi-itten, and not to allow ourselves to
be misled by the different powers of Parliament.
The Constitution of England, if written, would read thus :
"The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, except by Parliament." For, though, as Mr. Binney
contends, by the common law rule the Writ was deniable in no
case, yet, as it was liable to be taken away at any time by Parliament, the rule has been modified, and must be expressed as
above, to d<::signate exactly the operation of the English Constitution in this respect, at the present time, and at the time of
the formation of our Constitution. The rule, thus stated,
assumes the common law principle, and allows exception at the
discretion of Parliament.
B ut, the question arises, whether Parliament, in suspending
the privilege, exercises an ordinary legislative power, or whether it changes the Constitution by each act of suspension ;
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the common law rule being regarded as the law of the Constitution on the subject. For we must remember that Parliament
combines in itself, both the power, which, in the United States,
is exercised by a convention of the whole people, in connection
with the conventions and Legislatures of the separate States,
and also the power of Congress in its legislative capacity-laying aside the separate a,nd independent powers of tho State
Legislatures, as they do not bear on the question. In other
,rnrds, P arliament exercises what may be termed extraordinary
and ordinary legislative powers; in the former case acting in its
sovereign capacity, altering and amending the Constitution, and
in the latter legislating in subsen·ience to the Constitution
thus altered and new-modeled. In practice, this, extraordinary
power is seldom exercised, except on the most solemn occasions
or in cases of the most urgent necessity, and then, as a general
rule, with the full consent of the people; so that the English
Constitution is no more liable to change than our own.
Now the Constitution of Engla,nd, from its nature, can only
be changed by Parliament, and when that body exercises a
power not belonging to any other department, such exercise of
power, acquiesced in by the people, becomes a precedent for a
future exercise of the same power, and thus the Constitution is
modified to suit circumstances. It is exactly in this manner
that Parliament now exercises the right of suspending tho
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Parliament, in the
act of suspension, employs its ordinary legislative power
according to a settled Constitution, and the common law prin. ciple is mocli:6.ed to correspond with the rule above laid down.
The word P arliament, in that rule, corresponds to the legislatiYC department in our Constitution ; and the fact that it at
the same time possesses the extraordinary power of changing
the English Constitution, cannot affect the analogy. Such an
argument would prove too much : if true, the Convention which
prepared the Constitution, would not have been justified in
placing a single power possessed by Parliament in Congress,
1Yhile wc know that, in reality, t he great similarity of the powers
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of the two legislatures plainly proves that one must have been
a model of the other.
'rhe above rule then, it is submitted, expresses truly the present state of the English Constitution. I t assumes that the
privilege shall exist universal and pure, but gives to Padiament
the power to suspend it at pleasure.
Now, what is the rule of our own Constitution? It makes
the same assumption, and then limits it; not, indeed, to the
the discretion of Congress absolutely, but to that discretion in
times of rebellion or invasion; for, as it is the judge of the
requirement of the public safety in times of rebellion or invasion, and no one has a right to question that judgment, we must
take the j udgment itself as conclusive of the facts which it profosses to decide.
It cannot certainly be argued, that a limitation on the power
of Congress, and that is the only difference of any importance
between the two Constitutions, can affect the analogy, especially
when we call to mind that a,ny limitation on Parliament would
be nugatory, unless sanctioned by long custom, and even tl1en
it would not be absolutely binding, though of more force than
under present circumstances.
I have said that the clause in the Constitution of the United
States, (like that of England, if it were written,) assumes the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to be universal and
complete. That what is assumed is perfectly true, will plainly
appear "·hen we consider that the United States Government
possesses only those powers which have been delegated to it.
And as the right to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Coi·pus may be exercised only in certain cases, expressly laid
down, it is precluded in all other ca~es from any interfercnee
whatever with the Writ ; and that no doubt might be entertained on this point, a clause was introduced among the amendments of the Constitution, reserving to the States, or the people,
all powers not expressly delegated to the United States ; and
for a still further protection to the r ight of the people, further
amendments were added, the fifth article of which, after stating
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that " no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless, &c.," adds : " nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, witl,oitt due process of law," while
the sixth guarantees the right of trial by J°ury in criminal prosecutions, and contains other clauses, embodying the essential
principles of Magna Charta, which cont,iins the common law
principle so much dwelt upon by Mr. Binney. So that what
are above called assumptions, in t he case of written Constitutions, are rights equally and expressly guaranteed and equally
well guarded, in the Constitutions both of E ngland and the
United States.
'Co the position that this power is liable to abuse in the hands
of Parliament, I reply- first, that the instances of abuse cited,
are principally subsequent to the formation of our Constitution ;
and, secondly, that it was with a view to this liability to abuse,
that the times and the occasions of the suspension of the privilege, have been as definitely limited as possible in the Constitution of the United States.
From these remarks I conclude that, so far, there is nothing
to affect the analogy. But, before examining Mr. Binney's
second point, I wish to impress on the mind of the reader the
extreme imp1·obability, that, if our Convention had intended to
depart from the English rule, evincing as they do in their work,
so many evidences of imitation of the English Constitution, they
would not have made known their meaning by express words,
instead of leaving it to an inference, which has universally, up
to this period, been favorable to Congress, especially if they
meant, as is contended, to discar d the sadly learned lessons of
experience, and to place the liberty of the citizen in certain conditions, of not unfrequent occurrence, at the feet of a single
man.
The second reason given, why analogy woul d not allot this
power to Congress, is that the Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles
II., is an Act of Parliament, and that, by the Constitution of
E ngland, nothing but a subsequent Act of Parliament can
abolish, restr:1in, or impair such a preceding Act.
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Now, an Act of Parliament cannot be abolished, restrained,
or impaired, except by a subsequent Act of the same body,
because Parliament possesses the extraordinary power aboYe
mentioned.
So a law of Congress cannot, in general, be affected, except
by a subsequent law; but if the Constitution should give any
other department of the government power to suspend a law of
Congress, there is no necessity of a subsequent law of the same
body-which, Mr. Binney contends, is the present case.
Now, if the Constitution of England, by long use or by an
Act of Parliament, had said the king might suspend the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, he evidently would have the
right _to do it, though a previous Act of Parliament were
abolished, restrained, or impaired; but a subsequent Act,
taking away the power, would bar him, as it would have the
effect of changing the Constitution itself. From these remarks,
we learn that the only difference in this respect between tho
two Constitutions, is caused by the extraordina1·y power of
Parliament. 'l'his, however, if allowed to have any weight,
would, as before remarked, prove too much, and must therefore
be thrown aside.
Again, if Mr. Binney's reasoning be of any weight, the fact
that a precedent Act of Parliament is to be impaired, must
have been a reason for placing this power in Parliament. But
does any one doubt that if the king had the power of impairing an Act of Parliament of his own authority-for instance,
that in the present case, if he had the power of suspending the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, without an authorizing
Act of Parliament-would any one have the least doubt that
the Constitution of England would be so framed as to preclude
him from exercising such a power? It would be a risk of
liberty which Englishmen would not hazard. They have
placed this power in Parliament for a far weightier reason than
that an Act of that body is to be abolished, restrained, or
impaired. They knew that it was in that manner their liberties
could best be secured from the encroachments of the crown .
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Further, long before tho passage of the Aot of 31 Charles II,
which, by tho way, is but declaratory of the common law, and
when it was perfectly competent for the people to allow the
power to the king, none but Parliament had the right to exercise it, and eYen now, Parliament, or the people through them,
could, notwithstanding the Act of Charles II, give to the king
power to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
either at pleasure, or within such limitations as they should
prescribe; yet they retain it, not because an Act of Parliament
is to bo abolished, restrained, or impaired, but because, as
before remarked, the liberty of the people is safest in the hands
of Parliament. The fact that an Act of Parliament is to be
abolished, restrained, or impa.irecl, is a mere accident, and of no
weight whateYer, in determining the truth of the analogy.
To the same real cause, a watchful care of liberty, which
was effectual in placing the power in E ngland, where it is, we
owe the present power of Congress over this subject-thus,
further dissipating the distinction which Mr. Binn.e y attempts
to draw. The foregoing remarks may be thus briefly summed
up. Parliament has control of the operation of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus- not because an Act of Parliament is to be
abolished, restrained, or impaired, but because the Constitution
of Englancl, for the same reasons which influenced our Convention, has wisely given it that control.
While, then, the difference in these lights is of no weight, in
another it may be shown to be no difference at all. It is
a principle of our Constitution, that a law cannot in any
manner be impaired except by a subsequent law, unless there is
direct authority for it in the Constitution itself, and though Mr.
Binney asserts that there is such authority, it has not been
independently PROVED by him, but, if his argument is correct,
follows from the proof of his remaining positions. But as the
result of the present argument will be to prove that Mr .
Binney's position is wrong, and that consequently the Constitution is direct author ity for Congress, and not for the Executive,
it follows that we have a law under the Constitution guarantee-
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ing the Writ of Habeas Corpus; that the Executive has no
authority under that instrument, to impair that law, and consequently, that, as in England, the action of the Legislature is
necessary. Again, then, we come to the conclusion that the
analogy is not affected.
Mr. Binney states a third point, in which he says we must
be careful to guard against English analogy, and that is, the
circumstances under which the Habeas Corpus Act was passed,
and the object it was intended to secure. He then states those
circumstances, and that object. They may be summed up in
the phrase "jealousy of the crown;" for Jenks' case was more
the occaswn than the ca.use of the passage of the Act. The
arbitrary conduct of the judges of Charles II, had stirred up a
flame which could not be quenched, except by a statute securing
the people from such abuses for the future. The danger of a
popish successor had very little or nothing to do with the
passage of the Act. But though the Act of 31 Charles II was
passed through jealousy of the crown, it was but declaratory of
the common law, and it has not been proved that the Writ was
first introduced through jealousy of the crown. Certainly the
peculiar circumstances which occasioned the passage of the
Act, could have had no influence in the introduction of the
Writ; still the great value of the Writ, and the use to which it
is chiefly applied, always did, and still consists in protecting
the rights of the subject against the prerogatives _of the
sovereign.
But the same feeling of jealousy of the executive power
influenced the Convention that formed our Constitution. One
of their great anxieties was, lest they should establish an
office that would draw all power to itself, and endanger the
liberties of the people. They therefore required the Senate to
join the President in the performance of a number of his
duties, and everywhere manifested a disposition to limit his
jurisdiction and powers as much as possible. The Federalist
furnishes us with a lively description of the state of feeling
2
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with regard to the Presidential office,-the jealousy with which
its creation was regarded.
A jealousy, therefol'e, similar to that which gave its chief
importance to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and garn rise to the
Act of 31 Charles II, actuated the members of our own Convention, and affords an additional reason for the conclusion that
this power comes within the jurisdiction of the Legislature.
~Ir. Binney, however, infers from the weakness of the executive department, that it ought to possess this important power;
that is, a Convention which was very careful to expressly define
and limit the powers and duties of the Executive, is to be under~tood a;; conferring on that functionary, by an inference which
Mr. Binney calls natiwal, but which had never been drawn by
:rnybody, though tho subject had been thoroughly discussed, the
most dangerous power which a single man can be clothed with,
in a State which is governed by the people.
Again, Mr. Binney's statement of the powers of the King of
England, and the President of the United States, is apt to convey
a false impression. lie implies that the veto power of the Crown
of England is greater than that of the President. In theory it is.
It is an ab8olute veto, while that of the President is qual~fied;
yet we know that through the operation of parties, the President is seldom over-ruled; while on the other hand, the veto
has not been exercised by tho royal power since tho reign of
William lII, and then met with such violent opposition as
to induce William, on the second passage by the two houses,
of the bill regulating Parliaments, to withhold his veto, and to
occasion its disuse from that da.y to this; so that it may appropriately be called an obsolete power. Another circumstance
worthy of mention, is that though the king has the power to
1leclare war, and build ships, he is as much dependent on the
popular branch fol' the sinews of war, as our own President.
This much is necessary to show the exact relation of the executiYe powers of the two governments, though I do not regard it
as of very much importance to the subject of discussion.
From these remarks, the conclusion is that the analogy between
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the English Constitution and our own, is not defective and deceptive, but sufficient and truthful; that if there arc di:lfcreuccs,
they are owing to the watchful care of the Convention that prepared our Constitution, or to the different natures of the two
Constitutions, but arc not such as to affect the analogy.
'.l'he result of the investigations into the an:1logy of the two
Constitutions, may be thus briefly summed up.
1. The common law rule, that no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law, is a
fundamental principle of the English Constitution.
The same common law privilege is the right of every citizen of
the Unite<l States, under that provision of the Constitution which
s.~ys that " The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the StMes respectively, or to the people,"-which right, to
remove all doubt, was expressly affirmed in the fifth Article of
the Amendments to the Constitution.

2. The Constitution ofE nghnd, if its directions were written,
would assume the existence of the common law principle, which
is expressed in Magna Charta.
Our Constitution, being ':rittcn, a.ssumes the same common
law principle, which is expressed in the amendments to the Constitution.
3. The Constitution of England makes no exception to the
action of Parliament.
The Constitution of the United States limits the action of
Congress to certain times and occasions, but this circumstance
cannot affect the analogy.
4. Under the English Constitution, a law of Parliament alone
can make an exception to the common law principle, because a
law of Parliament alone can abolish, restrain, or impair a preceding law of Parliament.
Under the Constitution of the United States, there is generally the same necessity of an Act of Congress, and where there

20
is not, the difference is due to the extraordinary power of Parliament. Besides, the necessity of an Act of Parliament is, as
far as the present case is concerned, a mere accident. In any
of these lights the analogy is not affected.
5. In both Constitutions, the effect of the denial of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, is produced by action of the Legislature, in
connection with an act of the Executive department.
But, it must be borne in mind that the present, is only an
argument from analogy. and that in the course of the proof that
this power belongs to Congress, it may be argued, a priori,
that the Convention which prepared the Constitution would confer this power on the L egislature.

In this view, it is contended that the Convention, when
considering on which department to confer the power, whether
the L egislative or the Executive, would have selected the latter-First : because it was the most intimately connected with
the safety of the people, and has always been looked upon as
the best guardian of that safety. ·secondly : because, in looking at the country where they saw the Writ of Habeas Corpus
in force, or indeed at any country, they saw that the privileges
secured by such a Writ, had always suffered most from the king,
or the executive department of the government. And, lastly,
because they were, in fact, anxious in regard to the great
power of the President, and would not, therefore, have been
likely to have conferred on him a power so easily a.bused, and
so closely interwoven with the liberties of the people. All these
particulars have been more or less developed, when treating of
the analogy of the English and American systems of government ; but, it will be observed, they are here placed on an
entirely different ground. They are here offered, not to show
what actually was done, but what we should expect the Convention would have done ; and if there be any doubt in the former
case, the l atter argument is of very considerable importance.
H ence, if it can be shown that the qualifying words of the
clause in the Qonstitution, do not vest this power in the Execu-
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tive, it remains with the Legislature, either on the ground of
analogy, or a priori reasoning.
Tho history and position of the clause in the Constitution,
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, come next in order.
'r he history has been briefly given in a previous part of the
present argument, and may be found somewhat more fully in
~fr. Binney's pamphlet, as taken from Madison's Debates of
the Federal Convention. Mr. P ineknoy's language in his
"Plan of a F ederal Constitution," submitted on the 29th May,
1.787, docs not contain the word Legislature, in the clause
relating to the Habeas Oorpus, though the power of suspending
the privilege of the Writ, as Mr. Binney himself admits, was
intended to be conferred on that department of the government.
In his independent motion, offered on the 20th August, the word
Legislature was expressed. I t was omitted in the motion of
Mr. Gouverneur Morris, on the 28th August, which motion was
adopted, and now forms part of the Constitution of the United
States.
l\Ir. Binney contends that, inasmuch as the word L egUJlature
was left out of the motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris, it was
"struck out." By which he means that the power was intended
to be given to the Executive. The change, however, leads to
the following natural suggestions and inferences : The word
L egislatu1·e was omitted by Mr. P inckney, in his "Plan of a
Federal Constitution," because he supposed there would be no
do1ibt as to the department of the government which should
exercise the power. To aYoid all shadows of doubt he inserted
it in his motion of 20th August. Mr. Gouverneur Morris omitted it in his motion, because he saw there could be no reasonable ground for doubt on the point, and cotemporaneous and
subsequent exposition, up to to-day, have sustained the correctness of the view. Whether the change of language in the
exception, by adding "when the public safety may require it,"
makes any differcnte, and, if so, of what nature, belongs to
another part of the discussion.
'.l'he argument derived from position has been attacked, not,
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however, with very much success. It is first said that the
clauses among which it is found, are not all restrictions on the
L egislature. They all, however, contain some reference to the
action of the Legislature, and are in the legislative Article;
a,nd the restriction in the clause immediately preceding, and
those in the three immediately follo"·ing, are direct and
pure restrictions on the L egislature. If this was intended to
be of a different nati;u:e, the Committee on Style and Arrangement did their work very poorly, by placing it where they <lid.
Had they placed it beside the other restriction on the Executive"
department, pointed out by Mr. Binney, there would have been
less force in the argument from position ; but, situated where it
is, it must be regarded, in the present case, almost conclusive
of itself. The restrictive No would not be appropriate.
It is further said, that the proposition containing the law of the
Habeas Corpus, was introduced as an amendment to the fourth
section of the Article on the J1tdiciary, and that it was transferred to its present position by the Committee on Style and
Arrangement. This is offered to show the fallacy of relying on
position. If the words themselves, either expressly or by implication, or the context, furnished a plain solution of the present
question, the position of the clause would have little weight, if
contrary; but, as it has been attempted to throw doubt around
the subject, it is of very considerable importance, which is
increased, rather than diminished, by the fact that it has been
placed in it& present position by the Committee on Style arnl
Arrangement. This Committee, of course, must be taken to
have understood the import of the different portions of the
Constitution, and to have owed their selection principally to
that knowledge. The Committee also must have had some
object in view in changing the position of the clause. It was
first placed in the Article on the Judiciary, because it was a
restraint on the powers of the Judges, in granting the Writ.
The minds of the Committee must have been called to this
point, for it is the very object for which they were chosen.
Under these circumstances, it would have shown inexcusable
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ignorance m the Committee, if they had intended in any way
to designate the Executive as the power which was to suspend
the privilege, to have placed the clause in the midst of direct
restraints on the Legislature. It should, in that case, have
been placed, either among the powers of the Executive, or at
least by the side of tlie 1·est1·iction on tlie Executive depadment, pointed out by Mr. Binney. A failure in this respect
nega.tives any idea that the Committee supposed the power to
belong to the Executive, and as the action of the Committee was
confirmed by the Com·cntion, the same remark applies to it.
Having shown that tho phrase "suspending the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus," is properly applied to the Legislature, and having examined the arguments from analogy and
the history and position of the clause in the Constitution, I will
now endeavor to determine the exact bearing of the exception.
I will repeat the clause : "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus. shall not be suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public sa.fety may require it." The exception contained in the phrase "unless when in. cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it," it is contended by Mr. Binney, has been framed with the intention of
designating to a certain extent, the dep~rtment of t_he government, which was to have the right of suspending the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and that that department is
the Executive. I have said that Mr. Binney contends that the
exception is intended to designate the department which was to
have the right of suspending the privilege·; yet he states the
question arising on this exception, to be whether a legislative act
is necessary to ascertain the conditions contained in the exception,
and rests the decision of this question on another, viz., whether
the Executive is competent of himself, to declare those condit10ns.
'l'his argument of Mr. Binney, proceeds on the principle that
the former portion of the clause settles conclusively, that the
Executive department possesses the power, and that the only
question remaining is, whether it is competent to exercise it;
so that he seems to place no reliance on the exception as an
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independent argument, that is, as containing such conditions as
were better suited to the jurisdiction of the Executive, than
that of the Legislature. If this be his meaning, his argument
ma,y be very easily answered.
Mr. Pinckney's "Plan of a Federal Constitution," offered
on the 29th May, 1787, contained the following language :
"Nor shall the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion." Now according to Mr. Binney's reasoning, the words
"suspending tho privilege" denote an executive act, and the
only question would be, whether the Executive is competent
to declare the facts of rebellion or invasion. According to
Mr. Binney, and as I freely admit, he is so competent. Indeed
he is more competent to declare the facts of rebellion or invasion, than the requirement of the public safety on those occasions; for the plain reason that in the former case he would be
obliged simply to declare facts, while in the latter, not. merely
a declaration of facts, but a deduction from those facts is necessary. Thus wpuld Mr. Binney be forced, by his own method
of reasoning, to admit that in Mr. Pinclmey's "Plan of a
Federal Constitution, the Executive was intended to be the suspending power. He ~as, however, expressly admitted that the
LegislatU1·e was intended by Mr. Pinckney, to be the suspending power.
Mr. Binney certainly could not have overlooked so plain
a contradiction, a.nd for that reason, as well as because in other
parts of his argument he seems to rely on this exception as
independent means of proof (thus in summing up, he speaks of
the "power which can most properly decide these facts," and of
the "President being the properest and safest depository of the
power"), I infer that he intended that the Executive had not
only the competency, derived from his general powers, to decide
the facts of rebellion or invasion, and the state of the public
safety as affected by them, but that he was the most competent
and tlte best. However this be, I intend to argue on this
ground, and expect in the course of these remarks to meet the
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different positions of Mr. Binney's argument, and to prove
independently, that the Legislature is the most proper depository of the power.
Another remark I wish to add, is that, as "suspending the
privilege" may be a legislative act, and as English analogy is
truthful, as also by force of arguments a priori, it is a legislative act in the present case; and as Mr. Binney, by his statement of the question as given above, does not deny the competency
of the Legislature to decide the facts of rebellion or invasion, and
the requirement of the public safety in those times, but only the
necessity of such decision by the Legislature, as following from
the fact that the P resident is competent, I might consider the
argument finished, except the citing of authorities; but as it is
believed tha,t even the exception points to the Legislature as
the suspending power, or at least does not take it away, and
that many of the positions of Mr. Binney in the latter portion
of his argument, are equally untenable with those in the former
part, the true bearing of the exception will now be presented.
It might be strongly argued, as before remarked, that a Convention about to lay down a fundamental law with respect to a
privilege so intimately connected with the liberty of the people as
that of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, would not have left it to
the uncertainty of an exception, or indeed to any such uncertainty into which Mr. Binney's argument is calculated to throw
it. They evidently, and two generations following them, never
suspected there was a doubt on the subject.
I shall confine myself, however, to two points, either of
which if true, would be an answer to Mr. Binney.
It is contended, then, first, that this exception was introduced
merely to define the times and the occasions of the suspension
of the priYilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, without any
reference to the department, which was to exercise the power.
And secondly, admitting that it was intended to designate the
department, that was to exercise the power, that Congress is the
best judge of the public safety in times of rebellion or invasion,
using the word best in the sense of the safest and most capable.
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'rhe present exception is introduced by the worrl unless,
which is derived from a Saxon word, meaning to release, a.n d
when employed to mark an exception, means to release the
cases following it, from the operation of the general rule contained in the language preceding it. In the present case, it
denotes that the absolute restriction contained in the words preceding the word unless, shall not be extended to the exception
contained in the language following the word; or, what is the
same thing, the latter portion of the clause is released from the
restriction of the former . This is the meaning, and the only
meaning of the word unless. I t ha,s of course, no force of
itsclf, to apply to the latter portion of the clause, a rule which
is not a pplied to the former, and is always used when the same
standard is applied both to the general proposition and to the
exception. If, therefore, the language had been simply that
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . should not be suspended-in which case there would be no doubt that the Legislature alone could suspend- the word unless, with an exception,
would leave the power of the Legislature untouched, as it doeH
in the p1·esent instance. Any other construction would introduce a new interpretation of law, and legislators would be
obliged to be very careful, lest in making exceptions, they completely defeat their otherwise plain intentions.
But to recur again to the history of the clause. The "Plan"
of ~fr. Pinckney contains a part of the exception found in .the
motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris, which was finally adopted, to
wit : the words "nor shall the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion." :Mr. Binney admits, that in this case the exception cl()CS
not have any weight, in giving the power to the Executi\·e,
though adding the cla,use, "when the public safety may require
it," changes the whole meaning, and shifts the power from
Congress to the Executive. That is, indefiniteness is a ground
for the jurisdiction of the Executive; for it is certainly more
difficult to decide the facts of rebellion or invasion, and the
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requirement of the public safety in those times, than the single
facts of rebellion or invasion, the reason being the greater indefiniteness of the former. Yet, in another place, Mr. Binney
regards indefiniteness as a source of legislative jurisdiction, for
he sa,ys that the indefiniteness of the la,nguage used in Ml'.
Pinckney's independent proposition, offered on the 20th August,
where he says tho power shall be exercised only on the "most
urgent and pressing occasions," is a reason for tho jurisdiction of the L egislative, in contradistinction to that of tho
E xecutive.
While it is freely admitted that indefiniteness is one of the
strongest reasons for taking a power away from the Executive,
and giving it to the Legislature, it is by no means admitted that
it was the controlling circumstance in this instance; for it is
contended that the power was given to the L egislature in Mr.
Pinckney's independent proposition, for the same reason that it
was in his "Plan," and in that case certainly, the jmisdiction of
the Legislature cannot be grounded on indefiniteness. I t was
probably introduced in words, by 1\Ir. Pinckney, out of abundant ciiution, and struck out by Mr. Gouverneur i\Iorris, as unnecessary.
The most natural view to take of this clause, in the light we
are now looking at it, is that the Convention, in conferring the
power of suspending the deare~t right of the citizen, was anxious
that it should not be left to the discretion even of tlie L eg'i$lature.
I t was therefore proposed to confine it, first, to cases of rebellion or invasion, then to the most itr9ent and pressing occasions,
which would not necessarily include all cases of rebellion or
invasion, but might include others, and, finally, to cases of
rebellion, or invasion, wlien tlie public safety may require it,
in which form it was adopted. The latter portion of the clause
being naturally suggested by the fact, which was attempted to
be remedied by the second proposition, that the rebellion or
invasion may be of so slight a character, or confined to so small
a portion of the country, as not to call for the exertion of this
important power, in every case of rebellion or invasion. I t is,
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therefore, a very hard construction, which would convert an
eagerness on the part of the Convention to secure firmly the
liberty of the citizen, into an intention to j eopardize it, by
placing it in the hands of a department which, sad experience
had taught, was the most likely to abuse it. The true light,
then, in which to regard the exception, I insist, is as a limitation of the times and the occasions when the Legislature ma,y
take into its own hands, the liberty of the citizen.
But, secondly, granting that this exception was intended to
designate the department which was to possess the power of
suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the
question then is, which is the best judge of the requirement of
the public safety, in cases of rebellion or invasion-using the
word best in the sense of the safest and most capable. l\'Ir.
Binney, it has been remarked, presents this point in a somewhat
different light. After endeavoring to prove that suspending the
privilege is an executive act, attacking the argument from
analogy, drawing some inferences from the history of the clause,
and exa,mining the opinions of our Judges, lYir. Binney romes to
the exception, and attempts to prove that it has a great deal of
weight in the determination of the point of dispute. Now, if
suspending the privilege "can be nothing but an executive
act," there could be no necessity for the present portion of bis
argument ; but the importance he attaches to it, shows that he
does not consider the former question settled. He, however,
states the point contained in this exception as though it were
settled. The gist of the question, he says, "is whether it
requires a legislative act to declare the conditions," to wit, of
rebellion or invasion, and the requirement of the public safety
on those occasions ; and concludes, that inasmuch as the Executive is fully competent to ascertain those conditions, there is
no need _o f the interposition of Congress. This, unless he rests
his whole argument on the nature of the act denoted by the
words "suspending the privilege," is an unfair statement of the
question. The true question, if any weight is given to the
exception, is not whether a legislative act is necessary to ascer-
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tain the conditions of the exception, but whether the Convention intended that the Legislature should ascertain those conditions. And, in determining that question, they must have had
in view not merely the necessity of the action of Congress, nor
merely the competency of the Legislature, but its competency
together with the safety of placing it in that body. I s, then,
the Legislature more safe and capable than the Executive Y
That Congress is the safer-composed as it is of a large body of
men, coming frequently and directly from the people, divided
into parties, and with no desire, even if it had the ability, to
perpetuate its power-there can be no manner of doubt. Besides,
even if Congress does act, its action in suspending the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus does not, of itself, interfere with
the liberty of the subject. There must also be an imprisonment
by the Executive, which must follow the act of Congress suspending the privilege, as to all persons arrested for certain
prescribed offences, by authority of the officers of the united
States, to complete the danger of a. suspension of the privilege.
So that Congress and the Executive must both act, to prejudice
the liberty of the citizen, which certainly is safer than if it were
left entirely to the breast of a single man.
Again, this question leaves in all the arguments, mentioned
in another part of the discussion, with reference to the views
entertained by the Convention which framed our Constitution,
of the Executive power, as derived from English history, and
appearing in every part of the Constitution. A Convention
exhibiting such jealousy of the Executive, would not have considered it safe to invest him with this important power. I do
not at all question that the President can obtain a knowledge of
the facts of rebellion or invasion, and the requirement of the
public safety, sufficient to act upon. With his emissaries spread
over the country to do his bidding, he can obtain knowledge
sufficient to secure not merely the guilty, but a great many of
the innocent. If I ever had any doubts on this point, they have
been entirely dissipated. The President could do a great many
things which are executive in their nature; but the Convention
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has said that he shall not. He could declare war and make
treaties, without the advice and consent of the Senate, powers
exercised by the British Crown, had the Convention given him
the authority. But it is exceedingly improbable, that a ConYention which denied these powers to the executive, would confer on him a far more important one than either, by an implication, which it has required a very long pamphlet to present to
the mind. The safety of placing this power in the Legislature,
cannot admit of a doubt. If, then, the power is safer in Congress, it certainly would have controlled the Convention, and
ought now to control us, even though it were less efficiently
managed by tha.t body. This brings me to the question, whether Congress is competent to exercise the power. Here, however, the manner in which the suspension of the privilege is
effected, disposes of all charges of want of capacity in Congress,
for, as remarked, the action of the Executive as well as that of
Congress is necessary. There are, nevertheless, certa.in duties to
be performed by Oongrcss,which require certain qualifications.
'l'hcse qualifications are : :first, a knowledge of the requirement
of the public saJety, in cases of rebellion or invasion; and,
secondly, competency to a,et on that knowledge. First, of the
cognizance of the facts of rebellion or invasion, and their extent,
as affecting the public safety. Though in the present state of
advancement, with the aid of the railroad and telegraph, and
the knowledge of members coming from every section of the
country, and with the publicity with which every rebellion or
imasion that can, to any extent, endanger th,e public safety,
must be attended, it is idle to contend that Congress would not
)1ave, in every instance, sufficient knowledge on which to act;
and though, in the only case that has occurred in which there
was any step towards a suspension of the privilege-that of the
"Burr Oonspiracy"-Oongress seems to have been as fully
enlightened, as to the nature and e:x:tent of the conspiracy, as
the President himself; yet I infer the ability of Congress to
deriYe a complete knowledge of the extent of danger, arising
from any rebellion or invasion, from the first clause in the third
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section of the second Article of the Constitution of the United
States, which is as follows, to wit: "Ile (the President) shall
from time to time give to Congress information of the state of the
Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient." Congress, under this
clause, almost daily calls upon the different portions of the
executive department for information on subjects coming immediately under the direction and cognizance of that department,
and guides its action accordingly. I n the same manner, and
by the same authority, they can ascertain all the knowledge of
the President, on the extent of any rebellion or invasion; or
the President can communicate to them that knowledge, and
recommend the passage of an Act, which knowledge, added to
their own, would place them in a better position to act, than
that of the Executive himself.
It was under authority of this clause in the CouYention, that
President Jefferson, in the winter of 1807, recommended to
Congress the passage of a bill suspending the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus. That body refused to carry out the
recommendation of the President, and the event proved that
they were right. . But it may be said, and indeed has been said,
that Congress may not be in session. This is true; but the
President is authorized by the Constitution, "to convene both
houses, on exttaordinary occasions." For an emergency which
will not admit of the delay consequent on such a step-an
emergency which can hardly be conceived-for such a case of
overwlielming necessity, the Constitution has made no prorision;
and as the present is a constitutional arguurnnt, the case of such
an emergency forms no par t of it. '' Sufficient unto the day is
the evil thereof."
That the President can jmlge of the existence and extent of
a. rebellion, no one would be so foolish as to deny. But
this decides nothing, as shown,-the question being quite a
different one. But, evm when he is allowed to judge, as in the
instance cited by Mr. Binney, it is by construction of a statute,
and· therefore under the authority of Congress. It is not
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the President's duty directly under the Constitution, but under
Congress carrying out the provisions of the Constitution. They
gave this power to the Executive, because he was a very proper
person to execute it, and because it was not dangerous to civil
liberty, inasmuch as Congress controls the sinews of war, and
can at any time take from him the power, and dispose of it as
they choose, not inconsistently with any other provision of the
Constitution. This is a very different power from that claimed
in the present instance, where, according to Mr. Binney's
construction, the control over the liberty of the citizen, in
times of rebellion or invasion, would be unlimited by any
other body, either in extent or duration. Besides, Congress
in giving to the President the power to call out the militia,
was not unanimous. They, in one instance, even preferred
the Judiciary to the Executive. If, however, so much weight
is to be placed upon the opinion of Congress, the whole question is at an end, for Congress has given its decision of the
present question. In the discussion, in the winter of 1807, on
the expediency of suspending the privilege of the Writ of
H abeas Corpus, though Congress was at that time compo'sed of
the ablest men, and the subject was thoroughly investigated, it
was not even insinuated that the Executive had the power of
suspension; and the President must have been of the same
opinion, or he would not have taken the pains to recommend the
suspension to Congress.
But secondly, Congress having the requisite knowledge, can
they act properly on that knowledge ? Mr. Binney says, " The
Legislature cannot execute the power itself. If the power is
limited to them, they must delegate it to somebody. All that
is claimed for Congress to <lo, is upon some judgment of the
facts which constitute the danger to commit the discretion to
the Executive. But why form a judgment and then leave
the whole judgment to the Executive, as they must?"
This reasoning is the result of Mr. Binney's peculiar views
of "suspending the privilege;" but a word as to the manner
and effect of suspending the privilege, may offset the climax of
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absurdity to which Mr. Binney carries the reasoning of the
advocates on the side of Congress. The Legislature suspends
the privilege not by an executive act, but by a legislative a.ct,
suspending the privilege as to all persons arrested under the
authority of the United States, for certain offences and under
certain regul11.tions, which may be prescribed at pleasure within
the limit of its powers. This as before explained, of itself,
amounts to nothing, until the executive power of arrest and
imprisonment has been exercised, when the prisoner feels for
the first time, the effects of the suspension of the privilege, in
having no present means of regaining his liberty. The President then, does no more than his duty in time of peace. He
arrests and imprisons all who may be suspected of treason, or
other offence inimical to the government in times of rebellion
or invasion. And as the Legislature no doubt would require
the arrest to be made on oath and probable cause, as it is
enjoined by the Constitution, and has the power to limit the
offences at discretion, the action of the President is sufficiently
guarded. Thus we see the Legislature is perfectly competent
to suspend the privilege, and there is no necessity whatever, of
designating each individual to be arrested (though I do not
<loubt their right to do so), as Mr. Binney, according to his
method of reasoning, contends. As it is, after the suspension
of the privilege, the P resident does exact} y what would be required
if Mr. Binney's argument were true, except issuing the order
suspending the privilege of each individual, and the President
is as responsible for the arrest of innocent persons, as in time
of peace. Thus legislative judgment a,nd wisdom are joined
with executive vigor and efficiency.
The President no more judges of the public safety as to those
persons who are arrested and imprisoned under the authority of
the United States, than he does in case of those arrested and
imprisoned in tirne of peace. The only difference is caused by
the action of the Legislature in suspending the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, depriving the former of their means of
obtaining their liberty, while the htter enjoy the full privilege
3 -
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of the Writ. If the President is ambitious, and aims at regal
power, or endeavors to build up bis own party by crushing the
opposite, he has a wide scope even under the suspension of the
privilege by Congress. Now we will repeat the question :
"Why form a judgment, and then leave the whole question to
the Executive, as they must?" It is to prevent an ambitious
and unscrupulous Executive from getting up his own rebellion
or invasion, or taking adrnntage of one put on foot by another,
and judging of the character of that rebellion or invasion, as
affecting the public safety, to use the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as an engine in his treasonable efforts to attain power and rank for himself, or success an<l
spoils for his party. People in their eagerness to crush out
the present unrighteous rebellion, without any great regard to
the means, may not see the correctness and justice of this
roundabout method of proceeding, and the upright course of a
true minded and unaspiring P resident, may avoid all cause for
alarm on the subject of our liberties; but remembering that the
slo"· process of common law has never been found deficient in
the cause of freedom, and that a precedent having been once
established, becomes an authority, no statesman or lawyer
who has a genuine feeling for his country, can allow the present
opportunity to pass witl1out heartily endeavoring to come to a
settled opinion on the subject, and in coming to that opinion, to
wander as little as possible from the preserving principles of
the common law.
From these remarks, we conclude that though the President
is competent to suspend the privilege of the Writ of H abeas
Corpus, he is not at the same time the safest and the most
competent, but that these qualifications point to the Legislature.
Ticfore coming to a close, I will make a brief review of
the opinions expressed on this important subject. They
arc all in favor of the position that the power of suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus belongs
'to Congress. Chief Justice Marshall expresses his opinion in
his own clear language, which no one can misunderstand, yet
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)fr. Binney is disposed to misconstrue it, and after gradually
sliding from that position, closes with the assertion that it is
altogether obiter, which we admit. But still it is the opinion of
the greatest Judge, especially on Constitutional questions which
he made his chosen study, that ever sat on the Supreme bench.
'l'hough this opinion is not technically speaking, an authority,
it is a weighty opinion, and Mr. Binney's reasoning with regard
to it, proves that the Chief Justice did not comprehend his natural
distinction between suspending the Writ and suspending the privilege of the Writ. The whole of Mr. Binney's comment on this
opinion, is colored with the peculiar doctrines of his pamphlet,
an<l must be read in the light of the present reply.
Story takes for granted tho existence of the power in Congress, and only makes a question as to whom belongs tho right
to judge, when tho exigency which would justify a suspension
of the Writ has arisen. Mr. Binney, therefore, infers that he
demands or extorts the question in dispute. He does neither,
Ito accepts it as he would a freely offered gift. And as to suspending the Writ, and not the privilege, it only shows that
Story's opinion coincides with that herein advanced; that is,
that the Writ and the privilege of the Writ amount to the
same thing. True, Story was merely commenting on the Constitution, but his opinion is entitled to great weight, especially
when we consider that, with Marshall, he was a strong supporter of Federal doctrines. · Taney follows, in a clear, able,
and constitutional view of the very point, which was brought up
directly for decision. This decision was by a single Judge, and
Mr. .Binney's entire nrgument is devoted to a reply to it. Kent
and Rawle, also, have expressed themselves in favor of the
power of Congress. Indeed, not a single. Judge or Lawyer down
to the present time, in which a few biased ones have appeared,
can be found favornble to the power of the Executive. I will
add the opinion of another to the list-it is that of Judge Addison, of Pennsylvanit~, who uses the following clear language on
the subject : " Conforming to the principles of liberty inherited
from our ancestors, the privilege of the "\Yrit of Ilabeas Oorpus

36
is established, as a principle, in tho government of this State,
and of the Union. And though Congress or the General
Assembly may, respectively, like the British Parliament, by
hw suspend this privilege, yet they cannot, like the Bl'itish
Parliament, pass such law whenever they please. F or the
Federal and State Constitutions have declared, that ' The
privilege of the Writ of 1Iabeas Oorpus shall not be suspended
unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it.' So that, in this country, no citizen
Cttn be deprived of his liberty, without an avowed and sufficient cause, unless, in case of rebellion or inYasion, the Legislature think the public safety requires it, and suspend the
privilege of the Writ of 1Iabeas Corpus."* This was a chat'ge
to a grand jury, it is true, and therefore not technically an
a,uthority, but it is the opinion of a respectable judge, which,
added to the list, must be regarded as conclusive, especially
when we consider that some of these opinions were deli,·erc,l
shortly after tho adoption of tho Constitution, and that they
are all concurrent, while not a single contrary one bas been
i::uggested. The force of these facts, it appears to me, cannot
be resisted.
But, says Mr. Binney, there is a. judicial bias on this subject. On examim~tion, however, wo find the bias is not confined to tho judiciary, but extends to men of all classes and in
all positions. In every one of the State Conventions, which ratified the Constitution submitted by the Federal Convention, in
which the Habeas Corpus clause was discussed, and in most, if
not all of which, were men who ha<l been members of the F ederal Convention, tho power of Congress was either expressly or
impliedly recognized. . And in the consideration of the bill to
suspend the privilege of the Habeas Corpus, . passed by the
United Stetes Senate in 1807, though some of the ablest
speeches of the American Congress were then <leli,·ered, not

* See hie charge to Grand Jury of counties of Fifth Circuit of Pennsylvania
upon the Alien Act, December Session, 1 i98.
'
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one word was said with regal'd to tho power of the Pre,:idcnt, though e,·cry speech contained either an exprcsg or
im plie<l recognition of the power of Congress. Hence, there
appears to be something more than a judicial bias on tht•
,-ubject. Indeed, it is somewhat strange that the natural and
constitutional argument of Mr. Binney, though the subject haR
been so ably and violently agitated, should have so long Rlumhcred, to spring into form only at his magic touch.
A word now as to the power of the Executive to interfere
with an Act of Congress. Mr. Binney attempts to surmount
this obstacle by the assertion, that the Constitution is direct
authority for the action of the Executive, thus dispensing with
the necessity of an Act of tho Legislature. Though I admit
that, if the Constitution directly conferred any power 011 tht•
!>resident, a law of Congress could not prevent the exerci!ic of
that power, as being inferior to the Constitution, and t}lel'cfore
1rnll and void; yet it is very improbable that a power would
be given to the Executive, the exercise of which must trench on
a law of Congress, without being expressly and certainly dcfi11ed
nnd regulated; for in that case the will of the Executive becomes
law, and overrides the laws of Congress. The only instance of
:m approach to such a doctrine in the Constitution, is that of
'l'reaties, in the negotiation and confirmation of which, one
branch of the Legislature docs not participate. But they arc
P:t-pressly declared by the Constitution to be the supreme law
of the land; while the position of Mr. Binney, if true, would
present the extreme improbability of a convention granting,
by a far-drawn implication, a. power which they must have
known would come in direct conflict with tho action of the
Legislature. Nor has it been independently proved, nor, I
bcliere, attempted to be so proved by Mr. Binney, tliat the
Constitution directly authorizes the action of the Executive.
He considers it as following, from establishing the doctrine that
the power resides in the Executive. Having succeeded, as he
thinks, in establishing the latter point, the direct authority of
the Constitution follows as a matter of course. This whole
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argument, on the other hand, has been to prove that the power
of suspension resides in the Legislature, and consequently that
the Constitution is direct authority for the action of that department, and of course excluding the idea of Mr. Binney.
A circumstance which should be distinctly brought to the
attention of the reader, is the apparent indifference with which
l\Ir. Binney regards the liberties of the people. Thus in one
place he looks upon the suspension of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus as the legitimate duty of the Executive, because
he is charged with crushing the rebellion or repelling the invasion. Now we all know, that times of rebellion or invasion are
just the periods when the power of the Executive should be curtailed. Experience proves that it is in those periods that a people, especially a great and proud people, are most likely to sacrifice
liberty to national pride. Acts which in time of peace would
startle the nation, are then looked upon as legitimate remedies,
and thus are precedents established, and foundations laid for
the enslaving of the people. Let me repeat a remark previously made, and which cannot too often be forced upon
the attention of the reader, that the great, one might almost say,
the only object of the vYrit of Habeas Corpus is to preserve the
liberty of the citizen. This fact kept steadily in view, will furnish an answer to much of Mr. Binney's plausible reasoning.
The last circumstance which I shall notice, is the disposition
of Mr. Binney, to find fault with the expressions of different
persons in discussing the subject of the H abeas Corpus. They
do not seem to square with his distinction between the Writ of
H abeas Corpus and the privilege of the Writ.
The opinions of the J udges have been already referred to. I
wish now to draw the reader's attention particularly to the language of Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina. The following is :Mr.
l\Iadison's report : "Mr. Rutledge was for declaring the Habeas
Corpus inviolate. H e did not conceive that a suspension could
ever be necessary at the same time in all the States." This is
very clear. The meaning is, tnat it was not necessary to give
the power of suspension, under a.ny circumstances, to the
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general government, as it was hard to conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary, at the same time, in all the States.
Ito takes the view of the suspension taken in the present
review. IIe further implies that if suspension should become
necessary in one or more States, the power of the State government would be adequate to the exigency; yet Mr. Binney
asserts that there is some reason to doubt whether Mr. MadiRon's or Mr. Rutledge's mind embraced the technical doctrine
(quaere whether the constitutional and natural one) on the subj ect. If he means by this, his own, we think he will search in
Yain for the mind that did prior to the publication of his
pamphlet. Ilis particular view has enabled him to detect
a great ma,ny errors and absurdities in the opinions of men
whom we had learned to look up to with the highest feelings of
respect and honor; yet he appears to feel no compunction
whatever, in casting aside these opinions, nor any necessity for
r e-examining his own technical ALIAS constitiltional and natu1·al
doctrine, though coming to such a conclusion as that Madison
may not have known what he was talking about.
The main points of our argument may now be briefly
summed up.
'.l'he Constitution, assuming that the privilege of the Writ of
H abeas Corpus shall exist complete and universal, and thus
authorizing it, authorizes it to be suspended on certain conditions. The method of ascertaining doubtful powers of our
go\'crnment, by recurring to the source whence most of its
principles have drawn, may be truthfully employed in the
present case. T his leads to the conclusion that the Legislature
was intended to possess the power over the privilege of the Writ,
aud that, even assuming that English analogy is excluded, the
Legislature would have been invested with the power on original
grounds : that the distinctions attempted to be drawn by Mr.
Binney, either do not exist, or if they do, that they do not
affect the analogy : that the phrase " suspending the privilege"
is perfectly applicable to the Legislature: that tho history and
position of the clause, and authority and opinion, both judicial
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and popular, are on the side of Congress: that the language of
the exception was not intended to designate the department of
the government which was to exercise the power; and that ifit
was, the Legislature is the safest and most capable, and therefore the most proper depository of the power.
Pnn,ADELI'IIlA,

February 22, 1862.

